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‘No action required’: A historical pattern of inaction and discretion towards child sexual 
abuse in Queensland policing 
 
Paul Bleakley 
The Police Journal: Theory, Practice, Principles 
 
In the decade in which former commissioner Terrence Lewis led the Queensland police 
between 1977 and 1987, as well as in the years that immediately followed, a pervasive culture 
of corruption that existed in the Queensland Police Force. It was revealed through a 
comprehensive judicial inquiry in the late 1980s that criminal extortion tactics were rampant 
during Lewis’s time leading the Queensland police. As a result of these revelations, Lewis 
himself was removed from his position as Police Commissioner and, later, sentenced to a term 
of imprisonment on corruption charges (Condon, 2015). While the allegations directed at Lewis 
focused primarily on his protection of vice operators, there is evidence to suggest that the 
misconduct he presided over carried across into the investigation of child sexual abuse. In many 
ways, the failure of Queensland police to take decisive action in this area can be viewed as an 
expression of Durkheim’s anomie, a condition of normlessness that is formed in contexts where 
there exists mismatch between wider social standards and those of a specific socio-cultural 
subpopulation (Durkheim, 2003). Police culture has proven to be particularly prone to 
developing a state of anomie: as a profession in which organisational culture is strong enough 
to force the identity of police officer to become an individual’s master role, the opportunity 
exists for police norms to supplant general social norms and create an anomic mismatch 
(Kleinig, 1996; Arter, 2007). In spite of widespread social condemnation of child sexual abuse 
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in the community, the anomic conditions of Queensland policing led it to become an accepted 
norm to not take investigations into these crimes seriously in the late 20th Century. 
 
Organisational pressures to not proactively investigate child sexual abuse allegations is no 
doubt a dereliction of duty, however there is reason to believe that even more explicit 
interventions regularly took place in cases involving prominent people who were accused of 
sexual offences against minors. Allegations that police officers were complicit in the protection 
of child sexual offenders is not restricted to Queensland: in Australia, the Wood Royal 
Commission in 1996/97 revealed corrupt relationships between police and serial paedophiles, 
while the 2015 Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse revealed 
systemic failures in the investigation and prosecution of such crimes nationwide (Coate & 
Murray, 2015). These revelations are just one regional example of a global trend toward the re-
investigation of historical sexual abuse. In recent terms, the prominent focus on this kind of 
investigation can be traced back to the public outcry that took place in the aftermath of the 
revelations in 2002 that the Catholic Church in the United States of America systemically 
protected priests accused of child sexual abuse (Frawley-O’Dea, 2004). In the United 
Kingdom, a series of cases in which prolific child sexual abuse had gone unpunished was 
followed by the formation of Operation Fairbank in 2012; this special taskforce investigated 
allegations that the Metropolitan Police obstructed child sexual abuse cases that involved other 
officers or prominent public figures (Grierson, 2015). In each of these cases, concerns have 
been raised in relation to the anomic organisational culture that allows for such behaviour to 
occur. Given the serious nature of child sexual abuse allegations, the decision not to investigate 
and obtain justice for vulnerable victims can only be the result of a police culture that is 
fundamentally in a state of anomic conflict with the wider community. 
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Queensland provides a strong model of this kind of anomic organisational culture that can be 
applied to alternative contexts around the world which have experienced similar cases in which 
child sexual abuse has been systemically tolerated over a long period.  In several Queensland 
cases involving accusations against police officers, the decision that no further action would 
be taken was traced back to intervention by some of the most senior officers in the Queensland 
Police Force. In the case of prominent police officer David Moore, the Queensland Police 
Force’s reluctance to mount a thorough investigation allowed Moore to continue offending for 
more than two years (Garrahy, 1984). While Moore’s case was particularly notorious, it is also 
indicative of a broader organisational culture of tolerating sexual abuse that was out-of-step 
with societal norms. Archival research provides a range of examples in which police acted to 
obstruct investigations into well-connected suspects whether by making the discretionary 
decision not to investigate or more directly, by tipping-off or otherwise assisting offenders to 
conceal their criminal behaviour (Mackenroth, 1989). In each of these examples, a persuasive 
argument could be made that the anomic organisational culture of the Queensland Police and 
the moral deregulation cultivated during the Lewis administration resulted in a police force that 
adhered to norms that were fundamentally at odds with existing socio-cultural expectations 
around the policing of child sexual abuse.  
 
Literature review 
Policing and the application of discretionary enforcement policies 
A central aspect in the examination of the Queensland police’s response to child sexual abuse 
during the latter half of the 20th Century is an understanding of the factors that influence an 
officer’s decision to act. Academic research published in the period immediately preceding the 
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Lewis era focused on the issues of discretionary enforcement, an idea that became increasingly 
popular in Queensland with the rise of the Juvenile Aid Bureau (JAB) - a unit that largely 
adopted a discretionary ‘counsel-and-caution’ approach to young offenders. In his formative 
study of discretionary policing practices, Goldstein (1960) delineated between three distinct 
types of law enforcement: full, total and actual. Goldstein argued that full enforcement involved 
a strict interpretation and application of the laws as written, whereas total enforcement took 
into consideration the procedural limitations that govern a police officer’s actions. It is 
Goldstein’s view that full enforcement is impracticable, in that officers are legally and 
physically incapable of addressing all potential criminal acts to the fullest extent of their 
powers; he even questions whether total enforcement is truly possible, wherein officers pursue 
only that criminal activity which is within the scope of their statutory authority. It is with this 
practicability in mind that Goldstein advocates in favour of actual enforcement, acknowledging 
the broad discretionary powers afforded to individual officers in most law enforcement 
systems.  
 
Discretionary enforcement, or the decision not to pursue suspected criminal acts at all, was 
regularly defended by policing scholars like Klockars (1985) during the height of the Lewis 
administration in the mid-1980s. Klockars argued that it is necessary for policing agencies in 
democratic societies to hold autonomous decision-making power in order to effectively 
administer criminal justice in a way that may otherwise be precluded by the genteel sentiments 
of the general public. Essentially, Klockars accepts that some level of disparity exists in the 
norms accepted by a police force and wider society as a result of the variance in the experience 
that both groups have with society. While Klockars argued that this mismatch of social norms 
justified the exercise of discretion by police, it also serves as a reflection of Durkheim’s anomie 
theory of deviance (2003). If it is accepted that police have a greater experience of society that 
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gives them a perspective distinct from the average citizen, it follows that the gap between the 
norms of police and the general public could produce the type of normless moral deregulation 
described by Durkheim.  
 
Durkheim notes that the presence of an anomic condition does not suggest that police are 
inherent immoral: rather, he argues that a mismatch in the morality of a group and society 
results in competing sets of norms that conflicted with each other. In the case of Queensland, 
it could be argued that a pre-existing anomic condition led to a situation wherein the social 
norm of thoroughly investigating child sexual abuse allegations was in clear contrast with the 
group norm of non-interventionism that was prevalent in the Lewis era. This is not the first or 
only time in which the existence of pervasive corruption in a police force has had an impact on 
organisational culture more broadly: Passas observes that anomie is most likely to form in an 
organisational culture in which officers are institutionally socialised into corruption, as this 
causes police to find themselves ‘in a better position to neutralise and rationalise their acts’ 
(1990, p. 166). Taking a positivist standpoint in which deviance is primarily attributed to socio-
cultural conditions, this is a well-founded assertion that fundamentally rejects the concept that 
corrupt police officers are created in a vacuum without organisational culture playing any part 
in their behaviours (Punch, 2003). Instead of police corruption being the product of individual 
rogue actors – or ‘rotten apples’ as they are commonly described – it suggests that institutional 
characteristics of a police force play a key role in facilitating the development of deviant 
behaviours like those which were prevalent in the Queensland Police Force in the Lewis years. 
 
Discretionary approaches to the policing of child sexual abuse 
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More so than other areas of policing, there has been some level of scholarly interest in the 
application of a discretionary approach to the enforcement of laws relating to child sexual 
abuse. Mac Murray (1988) conducted an investigation of child sexual abuse referrals in an 
undisclosed U.S. jurisdiction which showed that 45 percent of reported sexual abuse cases 
resulted in no further prosecution; this data is useful in establishing a broad context, in that it 
is reflective of similar findings related to the policing of child sexual abuse in Queensland 
during roughly the same timeframe (Leivesley, 1984). Mac Murray’s findings seem contrary 
to the idea that the Queensland Police Force were exceptional in their approach to child sexual 
abuse in this period. It does not, however, indicate what the motivation for this apparent 
reluctance to act was, and it remains possible that the same type of anomic condition 
influencing Queensland police towards inaction was experienced in other jurisdictions as well. 
Another potential justification for inaction on child sexual abuse cases is presented by Mickow 
(1988), who contends that a distinguishing factor in the decision to take action is the 
relationship between offender and victim; Mickow argues that further studies must be 
undertaken into the proportion of those cases that are not pursued that involve a familial 
relationship, with the implication that action is more likely in cases wherein the offender is an 
independent party. Paulsen notes that the justice system ‘exercises a very great discretion in 
the prosecution of criminal cases’ and that ‘not all parents who have assaulted their child will 
be tried on criminal charges’ (1968, p. 176); this is attributed to the fact that prosecutors view 
such cases through a legal prism rather than a social perspective, and as a result make 
determinations based on the viability of obtaining a conviction in court.  
 
More recent academic analysis suggests that the discretionary approach to child sexual abuse 
cases has persisted since Paulsen identified the trend in 1968: Cross et al (2003) claim that it is 
relatively common for police and prosecutors to engage in a screening system with the express 
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purpose of determining the likelihood that such cases would be successful at trial, in many 
cases on an informal basis that occurs prior to the case being officially referred to the 
prosecutorial services. Police involvement in child sexual abuse is questioned further by 
Ashenden (2004), who notes the fundamental distinctions in the approaches of law enforcement 
agencies and child services departments in the investigation of these cases. Ashenden asserts 
that children’s services agencies must approach abuse claims ‘based on the balance of 
probabilities and the idea of the “real possibility” of abuse having taken place’; in contrast, she 
notes that police ‘have to gather evidence proving beyond reasonable doubt both that the child 
has been abused and the identity of the person(s) responsible’ (2004, p. 159). It is suggested 
that this additional difficulty faced by police in their pursuit of child sexual abuse cases is a 
key factor in the tendency of law enforcement to engage in discretionary practices on such 
cases, and underpins the perspective that it is inevitable that police will adopt a more hands-off 
approach towards abuse investigations due to the challenges associated with obtaining a 
conviction. Although it is possible that the challenges of building a case that arise from abuse 
investigations may account for some of the failures of Queensland police tasked with 
investigating such cases, a sufficient range of circumstantial and anecdotal evidence exists to 
suggest that a more purposeful reluctance to take action provided a more persuasive motivation 
for inaction. 
 
Policing child sexual abuse in Queensland 
Responses to child sexual abuse in Queensland is an area of police history that has been well-
covered in academic and popular literature in recent years. Condon’s series of non-fiction 
novels take a journalistic approach to recount the complex history of corruption in the 
Queensland Police Force and provides an almost exhaustive account of the actions of 
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prominent police officers and politicians during the era. While initially taking a vastly broader 
approach to police corruption than simply focusing on child sexual abuse investigations, 
Condon’s later works such as All Fall Down (2015) become increasingly concerned with the 
failure of the Queensland police to respond adequately to child sexual abuse allegations. Aside 
from the journalistic efforts of Condon, the reports of several judicial inquiries into the subject 
prove highly useful in identifying the key issues and failures of Queensland police on an 
investigatory and administrative level. Many of the issues explored by Kimmins (1998) in his 
inquiry into the policing of child sexual abuse in Queensland are not analysed in any great 
detail by academic researchers, or in any other journalistic works. As such, it is at times 
necessary to rely almost exclusively on the facts provided by Kimmins, albeit with 
consideration for the context and biases that naturally arise in such a judicial inquiry.  
 
More recently, the report produced by Coate and Murray (2017) as an outcome of the Royal 
Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse builds upon the findings of 
the Kimmins Inquiry almost two decades previously. Whereas the Kimmins Inquiry was 
predominantly focused on police responses, the Coate and Murray report is centred squarely 
on the case study of child sexual abuse at several Brisbane private schools. Although it is not 
as focused on the police aspect as the Kimmins report is, Coate and Murray’s case study 
indicates that prolific child sexual abuse was allowed to continue unaddressed by police well 
into the 1990s, as well as providing evidence suggesting some degree of collusion between 
senior police and known offenders. Reports of this kind provide considerable insight into the 
policing of child sexual abuse in Queensland in the latter half of the 20th Century, and are of 
significant benefit to researchers attempting to determine the causes of inaction in such cases.  
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Methodology 
Use of archival material is a central element in analysing the Queensland Police Force’s 
approach to investigating child sexual abuse during the latter half of the 20th Century. Official 
documentation can be used to develop a greater appreciation for the ways in which the 
Queensland police dealt with child abuse claims, whether sexual or otherwise. Comprehensive 
collections of correspondence and departmental reports regarding the JAB were accessed, 
alongside more specific caches of documentation related to individual cases. In order to fully 
explore the issues surrounding child sexual abuse investigations, documentation from the 
archives of the JAB was accessed from the foundation of that department in the early 1960s 
through until the limitations of the public access period in the mid-1980s. In Queensland, the 
standard non-access period on government documents is thirty-years, however this depends 
heavily on the content of the material included in these files. In sensitive cases like those related 
to child sexual abuse, archival material is often subject to a  non-access period of up to 100 
years or longer at the discretion of police administrators. There are exceptions to this standard 
rule, however: documents tendered before an official judicial inquiry are typically made 
accessible to the public in the interests of transparency. For this reason, much of the material 
regarding child sexual abuse accusations covered by this study are accessible because they 
served as evidence in one of several inquiries into police misconduct that were held in the 
1980s and 1990s. As case studies, they serve as tangible examples reinforcing the statistics 
regarding enforcement tendered in reports like that prepared by Leivesley in 1984. After 
assessing the available archival materials, it was determined that the Lewis era would be 
selected for further analysis due to the considerable amount of relevant documents that were 
found from this period. Whilst the origins of the discretionary approach can be traced to the 
JAB under Bischof, it appeared to have expanded in scope under Lewis to the point that it was 
a driving factor in the anomic condition in Queensland police culture.  
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The cases that were selected for inclusion in this study as representative examples of the kind 
of discretion applied by senior police under Lewis. It would be impractical for the purposes of 
this article to refer to each of the cases identified in this archives in detail, and as a result the 
most clear and persuasive of these cases have been focused on. This is not to say that they are 
the only files accessible, only that they serve as prime examples of the kinds of behaviour that 
Queensland police engaged in during the period under investigation. These cases are not unique 
and their persuasiveness is largely based on the breadth of documentation included in their 
archival files more so than any other criteria. As previously noted, this documentation is not 
always available due to the sensitive nature of the material and the restricted access period 
placed on it by the Queensland State Archives (Hurley, 1994). Some material, like that relating 
to former officer David Moore, was made public as a result of its presentation before the 
Fitzgerald Inquiry which crucially revealed the extent of police corruption in Queensland in 
the late 1980s (Calligeros, 2013). Open access material also contributes to the analysis of the 
police response to child sexual abuse: reports from judicial commissions like the Kimmins 
Inquiry - a judicial investigation of alleged police misconduct in paedophilia cases carried out 
in Queensland in 1997 - add greatly to primary source documentation, as do transcripts of 
speeches or articles generated by senior police officials that further outlines the policy towards 
suspected child sexual abuse cases. 
 
Findings 
Responding to allegations of child abuse by the Queensland Police Force under Lewis 
During the period that Lewis served as Police Commissioner, the responsibility for 
investigating suspected cases of any form of child abuse fell on officers attached to the JAB. 
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Founded in the mid-1960s, the JAB’s primary purpose was to address incidences of juvenile 
delinquency in Queensland by taking on a diversionary approach that was the first of its kind 
in Australia. Officers from the JAB were assigned as case managers to juvenile offenders, and 
sought to prevent recidivist criminal behaviours taking root in a form of early interventionism. 
While investigation of child abuse was not the JAB’s initial focus, their jurisdiction gradually 
grew to include responsibility for these cases due to their high levels of experience and training 
in working with young people. This duty was carried out on an ad hoc basis prior to 1978, with 
officers from the bureau’s Child Abuse Unit receiving informal referrals of suspected abuse 
from local hospitals and schools (Leivesley, 1984); the decision of state Cabinet to establish 
Suspected Child Abuse and Neglect (SCAN) teams in late 1978 essentially formalised this 
process through the creation of interdepartmental units made up of medical practitioners, 
personnel from Children’s Services and officers from the JAB (Heyworth, 1981). SCAN teams 
were formed under the cooperation of Children’s Services and the Queensland Police Force; 
this collaboration was an extension of a long-standing relationship between the two 
departments, which at one point in the mid-1970s was so strong that JAB officers were 
permanently seconded the Department of Children’s Services. As it was in this earlier example 
of interdepartmental collaboration, the formation of these SCAN teams was designed to ensure 
that all cases of suspected child abuse were reported to the relevant authorities and thoroughly 
investigated. Whilst this may have been the goal of the SCAN team, statistics presented in the 
1984 Leivesley report indicate that the JAB continued to take a lax approach towards the 
investigation of abuse cases, including those related to child sexual abuse. Leivesley found that 
Children’s Services officials referred 404 cases of child abuse to the JAB in 1982/83 through 
the SCAN team system; of these 404 cases, only 227 cases resulted in any further police 
investigation (1984, p. 5).  
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In spite of the fact that 177 cases in 1982/83 received no further police action, it may be 
suggested that the JAB were nevertheless active in the sense that they pursued more than half 
of the cases that were referred to their office. Further statistics presented in the Leivesley report, 
however, indicate that the JAB took a relatively passive approach to investigating child abuse: 
Leivesley highlights the fact that 76 percent of all suspected abuse referrals came to the JAB 
through the SCAN system, compared with only four percent of abuse cases generated from 
within the bureau itself. In the remaining 20 percent of cases, referrals came from a diverse 
range of sources such as schools, neighbours or – on several occasions – the abused child 
making a report to police directly.  Unfortunately, the data presented in Leivesley’s report 
largely did not differentiate between varying types of child abuse, and as such it is difficult to 
identify if a distinction existed between exercising the discretion to investigate sexual offences 
versus other forms of abuse. Nevertheless, the data is useful in the sense that it provides some 
level of insight into the attitudes of the JAB towards abuse, and Leivesley’s decision not to 
differentiate between differing forms of abuse indicates that no meaningful difference existed 
in the approach towards abuse cases. Although there are several ways to interpret this data, it 
appears that taking action in suspected cases of child abuse was not a priority of police: few 
investigations were generated from within the police force itself and, of those referred to them 
through SCAN, only 57 percent were given any attention whatsoever (Leivesley, 1984, p. 5). 
In compiling her report, Leivesley was given access to the files of all members of the SCAN 
system such as Children’s Services and the JAB. In the final Leivesley report, she indicates 
that the statistics she presents have been adjusted to reflect the real rate of referral; as such, it 
can be assumed that Leivesley’s figure is accurate and does not incorporate any variables that 
would unduly impact referral statistics such as duplicate or erroneous reporting of alleged 
offences. 
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Leivesley’s findings are consistent with the stated position of the Lewis administration, as 
articulated in a speech made by the commissioner in July 1984 to the Australian Crime 
Prevention Council. Lewis’s presentation, titled ‘Child Abuse – Is Police Involvement 
Necessary?’, was at odds with the recommendations of Leivesley’s report released several 
months earlier in March 1984. It was Leivesley’s recommendation that Queensland police 
engaged in earlier identification and intervention of child abuse cases in order to ‘save children 
suffering years of abuse before coming to notice’ (1984, p. 8). In contrast, Lewis argued that 
‘extremely rigid attitudes’ towards child abuse offences were unproductive and that his 
administration favoured a more discretionary approach (1985, p. 6). Lewis claimed that it has 
been the JAB’s policy from 1980 to avoid taking action in child abuse cases ‘so long as there 
is no pressing need to take action on the spot’ (1985, p. 5); he goes on to assert that ‘prosecution 
is not always the most desirable thing’ in child abuse cases and that it should be at the discretion 
of police officers as to whether a situation warrants a judicial response (Lewis, 1985, p. 10).  
 
Lewis’s preference for discretionary policing techniques is not isolated to cases of child abuse, 
and can be traced to his own decade of service in charge of the JAB. Whilst in this position, it 
was his directive to avoid prosecution and focus on counselling and cautioning offenders; it 
could be suggested that Lewis’s experiences in this position informed his later views as 
commissioner, in the sense that he was on the record as being supportive of policies that 
encouraged the use of police discretion to apply diversionary strategies rather than punitive 
action (Hodges, 1972). Lewis’s preference for a discretionary approach towards child abuse 
cases set the tone for an organisational culture in which child sexual abuse was not treated 
seriously and provides clear insight into the anomic conditions that governed the investigation 
of such offences in Queensland during this period. In spite of Leivesley’s official 
recommendation that substantive organisational changes needed to be made in this area of 
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enforcement, Lewis publicly reaffirmed the institutional norm that it was not necessary for 
police to intervene in all but the most serious and overt cases. As the primary driver of policing 
policy during his tenure as commissioner, Lewis’s influence on attitudes towards child abuse 
investigations contributed significantly to the development of the anomic conditions that led to 
a reluctance to act within the rank-and-file of the police force. 
 
Allegations of child sexual offences in Kowanyama – 1983 
As a result of the moral deregulation that arose from the mismatching of norms that was 
fostered under the Lewis administration when it came to child sexual abuse allegations, it is 
apparent that a number of those cases that were investigated by the Queensland Police Force 
were not dealt with in a way that was intended to obtain justice for victims (Daly, 2014). Whilst 
many of the case files related to child sexual abuse are subject to restricted access due to privacy 
concerns, several of those that are publically accessible indicate a pattern of inaction that can 
be traced directly to the most senior echelons of the Queensland police. A prime example of 
this unwillingness to act can be observed through the investigation into a Cairns-based fisheries 
inspector in 1983/84. Ultimately, this officer was not charged with or convicted of any criminal 
conduct in this matter; as such, to preserve their privacy, they will be referred to as Officer W. 
Allegations that Officer W had propositioned a 14-year-old Indigenous boy in the remote 
community of Kowanyama for sexual intercourse were conveyed directly to Commissioner 
Lewis a week after the alleged incident on 8 August 1983; despite the seriousness of the alleged 
offence, no immediate action was taken to investigate the claims against Officer W until Lewis 
himself requested a personal update on the situation in a letter to Regional Superintendent R. 
S. Jones on 7 December 1983 (Lewis, 1983). That almost four months would pass between an 
allegation of child sexual abuse by a public officer and the commencement of a police 
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investigation is indicative of the position of Queensland police during the period: if not for the 
direct intervention of the police commissioner in December 1983, it is highly possible that no 
further action would have been taken and the matter would have been left entirely without 
resolution.  
 
An official police investigation into the claims against Officer W commenced on 10 January 
1984, more than five months after the police were first notified of the suspected case of child 
sexual assault. A reason supplied for the delay in investigating the claims was that no action 
was to be taken in the absence of Detective Senior Constable Robert Adamson, who had been 
out of the area for a prolonged period (Adamson, 1983); that Adamson would be away from 
his post for the entirety of the five months between the allegations being made and the 
investigation commencing is unlikely, and as such it may be reasonable to infer that Adamson’s 
absence was only one contributing factor in a far more intricate and systemic organisational 
culture of inaction. After conducting a series of interviews regarding the alleged incident at 
Kowanyama, Adamson claimed that he had ‘no doubt that [Officer W] said what [the victim] 
alleged’ and yet found that were was insufficient evidence to proceed with criminal charges 
(Adamson, 1984, p. 2). Nevertheless, it was recommended that Officer W be relieved of his 
position as his conduct was found to be inappropriate for ‘a person in his responsible position’ 
(Adamson, 1984, p. 2). Adamson’s report and recommendations were dispatched to Cairns 
Criminal Investigations Bureau (CIB) on 22 February 1984; it was not passed on to Police 
Headquarters until 24 August 1984, over a year after the alleged incident had taken place 
(Atkinson, 1984).  
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Given the fact that the Kowanyama incident had been brought to the attention of the highest 
levels of the police hierarchy, the fact that a potential child sexual offender in the employ of 
the state government was not investigated for over five months highlights an apparent 
institutional tolerance for the kind of glacial approach towards investigating suspected child 
abusers that was adopted by lead investigator Adamson on this occasion (Flin et al, 1992). Even 
after Adamson ultimately made his recommendations to the Commissioner’s Office, it appears 
that the Officer W case was scuttled by the adherence to an organisational culture of inaction 
driven by senior Queensland police officers. The decision made by Atkinson to ignore the 
recommendation to terminate Officer W is reflective of a clear mismatch in the social norms 
between an investigator and an administrator: Adamson’s moral objections to Officer W’s 
continuing employment were largely disregarded by Atkinson, who himself operated under the 
social norms favouring inaction that prevailed at the police force’s Brisbane headquarters. 
Indeed, it is a recurring theme when it comes to the inaction of Queensland police in child 
sexual abuse cases that obstructive action was primarily taken by senior police in administrative 
roles, rather than frontline officers. A similar reluctance to act can be observed through the 
administrative intervention in the investigation of high-profile police officer David Warren 
Moore, in which Lewis himself took a proactive role to prevent revelations of child sexual 
abuse coming to light.  
 
Allegations against David Warren Moore – 1982 to 1984 
David Warren Moore’s case provides perhaps the most widely publicised example of the 
Queensland police’s reluctance to act on allegations of child sexual abuse in the Lewis era. As 
officer-in-charge of the department’s public relations unit and one of the most visible 
representatives of the force, protecting Moore’s reputation was a high priority for the 
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Queensland Police Force (Condon, 2014). Allegations that Moore was involved in the 
production of gay pornography and sexual misconduct with underage teenage boys were first 
brought to the attention of senior police officials in September 1982 (Garrahy, 1982). On being 
brought to the attention of Lewis, investigating officers recall being ‘dissatisfied with… 
reluctance by the police hierarchy to act quickly’ on Moore (Kelly, 1988, p. 2); Francis Rynne, 
who led the JAB in 1982, claims that Lewis told him personally that ‘rumours are not evidence’ 
and not to take any further action on the claims against Moore (Rynne, 1988, p. 4). Again, there 
appears to have been a state of disconnect between the perspective of investigating officers and 
senior police administrators when it came to the best way to deal with the Moore case. Lewis’s 
argument that ‘rumours are not evidence’ are reflective of an unwillingness to take action: 
whilst unverified tip-offs and criminal intelligence may not be enough to support a case 
entirely, it is common practice to use this kind of material to inform an investigation that may 
itself bear the evidence necessary to prosecute a suspected offender. For Lewis to suggest that 
rumours were not enough to substantiate further investigation of Moore purposefully 
misrepresents the role of intelligence in policing for the purposes of obstructing the JAB’s 
proposed investigation. Once again, a mismatch of competing norms between the JAB and the 
Lewis administration appears to have contributed to an anomic condition in which the moral 
imperative to act was stymied by the competing norms advocated by the Commissioner’s 
Office. 
 
Further allegations continued to be made against Moore in the period between this initial 
accusation of child sexual abuse and his arrest in late 1984. Of particular note is the 
involvement of Deputy Commissioner Syd Atkinson in refusing to take action against Moore. 
On being made aware that Moore had been observed soliciting sex in a Stafford toilet block in 
November 1982, Atkinson neglected to request a written report be supplied (Atkinson, 1988); 
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later, after Moore was again accused of sexual impropriety by an anonymous caller to the police 
switchboard in January 1983, Atkinson annotated the report with the words ‘seen’ and ‘file 
away’ without taking any further action (Dargusch, 1984, pp. 3-4). Coincidentally, it was also 
Atkinson who refused to pass on the recommendation of Adamson that Officer W should be 
removed from his position when notifying the Department of Harbours and Maritime that no 
charges would be pursued in that 1983 case (Atkinson, 1984). Although such actions could 
undoubtedly be construed as protecting suspected child sex offenders, it is likely that 
Atkinson’s actions in the Officer W and Moore cases were a natural repercussion of the anomic 
moral deregulation that was being driven by senior police and championed by the 
Commissioner’s Office. While it was unquestionably obstructive not to take action on these 
serious allegations, Atkinson’s decision not to was completely reflective of the Queensland 
Police Force’s overarching policy of non-interventionism on such matters and should not be 
considered a proactive effort to collude with and protect the individuals under investigation.  
 
Whereas Atkinson’s role in covering for both Officer W and Moore can be attributed to a broad 
organisational policy of non-interventionism, officers responsible for the Moore investigation 
have alleged that Lewis engaged in collusion and misconduct in his efforts to prevent charges 
being laid. Mike Garrahy, the officer who had written the initial September 1982 report on 
Moore’s suspected offences, accused the Commissioner’s Office of tampering with the brief 
against Moore prior to it being forwarded to the prosecutors who would determine whether the 
case was strong enough to bring charges before the court (Garrahy, 1984). Garrahy told Police 
Minister Bill Glasson in a meeting held on 19 December 1984 that prosecution against Moore 
did not proceed in 1982 as a result of the Crown Law office receiving an incomplete brief from 
the Commissioner’s Office. Garrahy claims that there were elements of the brief that were 
removed between the time he provided it to the Commissioner’s Office and the time that it was 
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forwarded to the Crown Law office, suggesting that someone in the Commissioner’s Office 
wanted to ‘protect Moore’ and that such interference rendered the entire investigation ‘off 
bounds … a hopeless situation’ (Garrahy, 1984, p. 21).  
 
If Garrahy’s claims regarding the Moore file are given some credit, as they appear to have been 
by Glasson, it suggests that police inaction on the Moore case goes beyond the standard 
tendency towards discretionary enforcement of child sexual abuse cases. Instead, it indicates 
that senior police administrators actively conspired to prevent a case being brought against 
Moore that could have had a negative impact on the reputation of the Queensland Police Force 
(Dickie, 1988). At the very least, it is apparent that the claims against Moore were routinely 
ignored by police administrators; unlike the Officer W case, which was seemingly an isolated 
incident, the accusations against Moore were varied and substantiated over a period of two 
years. For the Lewis administration to avoid a thorough investigation into Moore throughout 
this period gives the impression that the Queensland police did not operate under a set of norms 
that were aligned with the expectations of the general public and, to some degree, its own rank-
and-file officers. It seems that police administrators including Lewis were more concerned with 
protecting one of their own than they were in getting to the truth of the matter and, ultimately, 
obtaining justice for the victims of Moore’s offences.  
 
‘Political reasons’ and the cover-up of the Grenning file by the Queensland Police Force 
Aside from its role in the exposure of  the administrative efforts to protect David Moore from 
prosecution, the events of the Fitzgerald Inquiry also led to the rise of further allegations of 
misconduct in relation to the investigation of public figures accused of child sexual offences. 
In a series of articles published in the Courier-Mail throughout August 1997, journalist Michael 
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Ware alleged that Lewis had kept a set of ‘dirt files’ in his safe in the Commissioner’s Office; 
it was suggested that these files contained information on ‘possible criminal sexual behaviour 
involving top state and federal government advisers and senior Queensland public servants’ 
that was used as a tool of blackmail and extortion by Lewis and his cohorts (Kimmins, 1998, 
p. 21). In an interview with the Kimmins Inquiry, which had been established in large part to 
investigate these allegations, Ware claimed that these dirt files had been removed from Lewis’s 
safe by Fitzgerald Inquiry investigators in subsequent raids on the Commissioner’s Office on 
22 September 1987 and his private residence on 1 July 1988 (Kimmins, 1998, p. 52). As it was 
in the Kowanyama case of 1983, the prolonged period of time between the Fitzgerald Inquiry’s 
search of Lewis’s office and his private residence is problematic: by waiting over nine months 
to search the commissioner’s home, it is highly likely that any inflammatory or suspect material 
would have been removed in the expectation that investigators would eventually make the 
decision to mount a raid of the premises. Though the specific documents removed from Lewis’s 
safe were not able to be located, several items matching their description were uncovered in a 
search of the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) evidentiary holdings; in particular, one of 
the ‘dirt files’ described by Ware relating to National Party adviser Russell John Grenning was 
located, with a copy of said file having been supplied to the CJC by an officer with the Child 
Exploitation Squad, Tony Wright (Kimmins, 1998). Whilst this copy of the Grenning file was 
not the original referred to by Ware, the fact that it matches almost exactly with that document 
gives credence to the belief that some version of it was once part of the cache referred to as 
Lewis’s dirt files. 
 
In spite of the similarities between the documents referred to by Ware as Lewis’s dirt files and 
the Child Exploitation Squad’s file on Grenning, the Kimmins Inquiry found that there was no 
evidence to support the suggestion that Lewis had kept the original file to use for any illicit 
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purposes (Condon, 2015). Even so, the Grenning file came under scrutiny by Kimmins as a 
result of annotations made to the document suggesting a lack of action on claims against 
Grenning due to his high-profile position within the state bureaucracy. The file itself consisted 
of several pages including a letter purportedly sent by Grenning on 5 January 1981 to an 
individual suspected by Victorian Police of being a purveyor of child pornography; this letter 
was accompanied by correspondence from Victoria’s Task Force Delta on 29 March 1983, who 
had discovered the letter and believed it to be worthy of further investigation by their 
Queensland counterparts (Kimmins, 1998). Most curiously, these documents were bundled 
with a handwritten annotation by Child Exploitation Squad officer Mark McCoy dated 7 
January 1981 which stated ‘No action to be taken. Political reasons’ (Kimmins, 1998, p. 29). 
McCoy’s amendment to the Grenning file is intriguing for several reasons and bears a range of 
implications, not the least of which being the suggestion that Queensland police took no action 
against Grenning for the explicit reason that he was strongly connected to the ruling National 
Party. From mid-1984 Grenning served as press secretary for prominent government minister 
Russell Hinze, prior to which he had served as a public service employee in a variety of 
capacities since at least 1979; it is highly reasonable to suggest that Grenning would have been 
a candidate for police protection as a result of his professional and personal associations in the 
National Party (Masters, 2008). Considering this in combination with the Queensland Police 
Force’s previous actions in the Moore case, it again appears to have been an organisational 
priority to prevent allegations of child sexual offences against prominent individuals like 
Grenning from becoming public; whereas these accusations constituted serious criminal 
offences, the anomic state of policing in Queensland meant that the need for a thorough 
investigation was disregarded in favour of purposeful inaction designed to protect the 
reputation of suspected connected to the political establishment.   
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Despite the clear suggestion of a conspiracy to prevent Grenning from facing an investigation, 
Kimmins determined that there was reason to believe that McCoy had made his annotation at 
some point in late 1984, and that he had post-dated his addition to the file to give the appearance 
that it had been seen and dealt with at the time it was first received by the Child Exploitation 
Squad. Kimmins found inconsistencies in the timeline proposed by the documents, particularly 
given that McCoy had apparently seen the letter in early 1981 in spite of the fact that the 
Queensland Police Force had only received the Grenning letter from Task Force Delta in March 
1983 (Kimmins, 1998). Whilst this may have been an inadvertent error on McCoy’s part in 
having written the wrong date, Kimmins believed that it was McCoy’s intent in making his 
annotation to provide a reason for his unit’s lack of action on Grenning after the fact (Kimmins, 
1998). McCoy himself admitted that his reference to ‘political reasons’ prevented a thorough 
investigation of the Grenning claims was made primarily to provide a rationale for why the 
Child Exploitation Squad had not taken appropriate measures to investigate these accusations; 
McCoy told the Kimmins Inquiry on 1 October 1997: 
‘I was concerned if Grenning, if he was a ped, would continue in his activities and someone 
later on would get this documentation say, “hey, Mark McCoy did nothing about this 
whatsoever, what’s the go?” and so at least if they saw that [the annotation] on the back there, 
it would start their minds thinking.’ (Kimmins, 1998, p. 33) 
Regardless of whether pressure was placed on the Child Exploitation Unit not to carry out an 
investigation into Grenning or not, McCoy admits that no action was taken as a result of his 
unit’s belief that political interference would prevent a successful outcome. McCoy’s statement 
shows that officers in the JAB were explicitly aware that there was an anomic mismatch of 
norms that existed between its frontline officers and their superiors at police headquarters. 
Again, this anomic condition derives from a misalignment of priorities in the Queensland 
Police Force: political patronage was a central element of the force’s organisation culture under 
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Lewis, and in situations where political allies were compromised it was this subcultural factor 
that prevailed over the need for an appropriate investigation to take place. In this sense, the 
organisational culture of the Queensland Police Force contributed to a state of anomie even 
within the force itself, as well as being out of step with community expectations. It appears that 
political interference was an expectation in cases of this nature, giving further indication that 
obstructionism was a norm that was adopted by police administrators in child sexual abuse 
cases. It is this understanding of the prevailing organisational culture in Queensland policing 
that contributed to the investigation of Grenning being dropped in anticipation of intervention 
from the Commissioner’s Office. In Grenning’s case, the inaction of Queensland police can be 
demonstrably proven to have been a professional failure of judgement: Grenning was jailed for 
twelve months in 2011 after police discovered 4297 pornographic images of children on his 
home computer in a raid on 15 July 2010 (Keim, 2011). Whilst this does not prove that 
Grenning was guilty at the time of the aborted investigation into his conduct in the mid-1980s, 
the similarities of the allegations provide sufficient reason to believe that earlier intervention 
by Queensland police may have had an impact on addressing Grenning’s behaviour over 25 
years before he was ultimately arrested.  
 
Allegations by Kevin Lynch of collusion with a senior Queensland police officer 
In arguing that an anomic organisational culture prevailed in the Queensland Police Force and 
that was a root cause of obstruction in child sexual abuse cases, blame cannot solely be 
apportioned to former commissioner Terry Lewis. Evidence suggests that other senior officers 
that served during his tenure as commissioner also demonstrated an anomic development of 
norms that resulted in a deviant response to child sexual abuse cases. Documentation tendered 
to the Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Sexual Abuse in 2015 shed light 
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on the possible collusion of senior police officers with one of Queensland’s most prolific sexual 
offenders, Kevin Lynch. As a teacher and counsellor at prestigious Brisbane Grammar School 
and St Paul’s at Bald Hills between 1973 and 1997, it is suspected that Lynch was responsible 
for sexually abusing hundreds of young boys in spite of repeated warnings to both the school 
and law enforcement (Coate & Murray, 2015). He was ultimately arrested after a police 
operation that saw a former victim - referred to by the anonymous designation of BSE - go to 
Lynch’s private residence in November 1996 whilst wearing a recording device, in an attempt 
to capture his former abuser admitting to engaging in inappropriate sexual conduct with minors 
(Branco, 2015). BSE’s attempt was successful, with Lynch admitting to having sexually abused 
several students, and as a result Lynch was arrested in January 1997; he never faced trial for 
his crimes, as Lynch took his own life the day after his arrest (Coate & Murray, 2017).  
 
Although it was not the purpose of the police operation to connect Lynch to a broader network 
of child sex offenders and their protectors, the transcript of BSE’s clandestine recording 
suggests that Lynch enjoyed a close relationship with senior police to the extent that he claimed 
to he was able to use this relationship as a way to shield his sexual misconduct. Lynch told 
BSE that ‘one advantage I’ve got is that I’m very personally connected with the Assistant 
Commissioner of Police’ and that he used this relationship to arrange for young people accused 
of criminal behaviour to not be charged; in doing so, Lynch was able to ingratiate himself to 
potential victims as a powerful figure to whom they were indebted and, thereby, facilitated his 
abusive practices (Lynch, 1996, p. 6). Lynch also told BSE that he had arranged with the 
Assistant Commissioner to use police resources to intimidate and harass two young men that 
he accused of raping him; he claimed that he asked the unnamed senior police officer not to 
document the allegation or investigation as Lynch did not ‘want to be associated with’ his 
alleged rapists through official paperwork (Lynch, 1996, p. 7).   
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It is highly possible that Lynch may have been lying about his relationship with senior police 
officers to intimidate or impress BSE. Not only was BSE a former victim over whom Lynch 
had previously enjoyed a power-relationship that he may have been looking to reassert, 
Lynch’s story of having been raped by two young men very possibly could have been designed 
to elicit sympathy and cast himself in the role of victim from BSE’s perspective (Marshall et 
al, 2001). That said, it is impossible to dismiss Lynch’s claims offhand due to the tangible 
evidence that he was ‘very personally connected’ to Assistant Commissioner of the 
Metropolitan North Region, Gregory Lance Early. Awarded the rank of Assistant 
Commissioner on 4 March 1993, Early lived for many years at on Conifer Street in the north 
Brisbane suburb Alderley (Pointing, 2014); during this period, it is likely that he would have 
been in close contact with Lynch, who lived directly next door to Early on Conifer Street 
according to state electoral rolls from the period. Even if Lynch did know Early personally, it 
does not prove that his claims about his access to police protection were in any way truthful, 
and as such they must continue to be treated with a significant level of scepticism.  
 
Given his record as a long-time sexual offender, known for lying and manipulating the truth, 
Lynch’s claims of collusion with senior police must be considered highly dubious: Early has 
never been charged with any criminal act in relation to his service with the Queensland Police 
Force and there is very little reason to cast such aspersions. Nevertheless, it is important to note 
that the recording in which Lynch claimed a close association with an Assistant Commissioner 
was in the possession of Queensland police since November 1996; in the period that followed, 
it appears that minimal effort was made to investigate these allegations in spite of the fact that 
a basic search of the electoral roll would have revealed Early as the most likely subject of 
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Lynch’s accusations. While this unwillingness to investigate a senior officer for collusion in 
child sexual abuse bears many similarities to the reluctance demonstrated by Lewis in the 
Moore case, it occurred more than a decade after the investigation into Moore and several years 
after Lewis himself had been suspended from the Queensland Police Force. This shows that 
obstruction of child sexual abuse investigations was not a practice driven by one ‘rotten apple’ 
– in this case Lewis. Instead, it takes the positivist view promoted by Punch (2003) that police 
misconduct is the result of systemic factors of organisational culture. Lewis was instrumental 
in protecting prominent suspects like David Moore, however this is simply a reflection of a 
broader anomic condition that existed during his term of service and, as the Lynch case shows, 
persisted after his dismissal. Even if Lynch’s claims of being connected to a senior officer were 
completely untrue, the failure of investigating officers to investigate such a serious accusation 
reinforces the fact that an organisation culture favouring discretionary inaction existed in the 
Queensland Police Force even after the reforms of the post-Fitzgerald era. 
 
Suspected police involvement in the compromising of Operation Firefighter 
The presence of an anomic organisational culture in the Queensland Police Force facilitating 
the obstruction of child sexual abuse investigations in the post-Lewis era can also be observed 
in investigations beyond the Lynch case. One of the key allegations examined by the Kimmins 
Inquiry in 1997/98 was the claim that senior Queensland police administrators had intentionally 
acted to obstruct investigations into child sexual abuse that may have reflected negatively on 
public figures or members of the judiciary. Though the inquiry audited several investigations 
from the late 1980s and early 1990s during its sitting period, allegations made in the case of 
Operation Firefighter were most damning to the Queensland Police Force. Running over three 
years from 1988 until 1990, the Sexual Offenders Squad established Operation Firefighter in 
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response to intelligence received from other states that known paedophiles were relocating to 
Brisbane to target vulnerable young people attending Expo 88, a six-month long fair held in 
Brisbane in mid-1988 to commemorate the bicentennial of Australia’s settlement. Intelligence 
received from law enforcement agencies interstate suggested that a group of known child sex 
ofenders had established a local branch of the Sydney-based paedophile network Boy Lovers 
and Zucchini Eaters (BLAZE) in Brisbane to coincide with Expo 88 and take advantage of the 
high numbers of young people that would be attending the festival (Kimmins, 1998). The first 
incarnation of Operation Firefighter culminated in August 1988 due to a lack of funding, and 
the determination that much of the evidence collected thus far was not actionable or useful in 
formulating a brief to go before the courts; nevertheless, Operation Firefighter was revived by 
the newly-formed Paedophile Task Force in February 1989 after raids conducted interstate 
indicated that several members of the network who had previously been uncovered in 1988 
were still actively soliciting and committing child sexual offences (Kimmins, 1998).  
 
Public service employee Desmond Patrick Kenafake was a central target of Operation 
Firefighter due to the fact that officers believed he was assisting the paedophile network in 
avoiding prosecution through the access he was afforded through his employment with the 
state’s Police Complaints Tribunal (Condon, 2015). It was the belief of the officers leading 
Operation Firefighter ‘that Kenafake was able to access photographs of police officers, 
including the staff of the Sexual Offenders Squad’ and, as such, compromise their ability to 
disrupt or investigate his network of child sex offenders by way of an undercover operative 
(Kimmins, 1998, p. 89). Accordingly, Kenafake was placed under surveillance while 
arrangements were made to mount a series of raids on he and his associates that it was believed 
would facilitate the breakdown of a well-established child pornography ring operating out of 
south-east Queensland. Although the raids were due to be conducted on the morning of 4 April 
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1989, it became apparent on 3 April that journalists had been made aware of the impending 
police action, forcing Operation Firefighter officers to bring forward the timeline for their raids 
in order to prevent the subjects of their investigation being forewarned and disposing of 
potentially incriminating evidence (Mackenroth, 1989). On 4 April 1989, it was alleged by 
Opposition Spokesperson for Police, Terry Mackenroth that the source of the information leak 
came from within the upper ranks of the police force, potentially as high as Acting 
Commissioner Ronald Redmond himself. Mackenroth claimed that:  
‘Acting Commissioner Redmond summoned the detectives involved in this inquiry to his office 
and demanded that they hand over the originals of all tapes and statements. After tense and 
angry discussions and negotiations the detectives would only agree to hand over copies of the 
material, insisting on retaining the originals… However, I understand that, because of 
interference at the very top level, the police can no longer go ahead with a raid on the premises 
of [a] prominent political figure. Police had actually prepared a warrant to search his premises 
but, as they are aware that he has been fully informed of their investigations, this has been 
scrapped’ (Mackenroth, 1989, p. 3935). It was Mackenroth’s contention that Redmond had 
attempted to obtain originals of Operation Firefighter’s investigation documentation in order 
to cover up any evidence of inappropriate conduct on the part of ‘protected’ individuals; in his 
view, the refusal of Redmond’s request led the Acting Commissioner to leak information 
regarding impending raids to give those affected time to prepare and protect their own interests.  
 
Mackenroth’s accusation is supported by evidence provided by Operation Firefighter officer 
Kym Goldup, who claims that she personally coded each copy of the task force’s files to assist 
in identifying any leaks. Goldup asserts that Kenafake had access to a copy of Operation 
Firefighter files sent to the Police Complaints Tribunal that had the same code as the copy 
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provided to Redmond (Condon, 2015). If true, the actions taken by Redmond are highly 
comparable to those that Lewis was accused to in the Grenning case and reflect a continuation 
of the obstructionist policies of the Lewis era in the period after he was removed from office. 
This suggests that intervention to obstruct child sexual abuse investigations was not solely a 
discretionary approach taken by Lewis: it indicates a broader condition of anomie that 
characterises the organisational culture of policing in Queensland, in which a process of moral 
deregulation resulted in a system wherein the protection of prominent individuals superseded 
bringing child sexual offenders to justice.  Though these allegations against Redmond and other 
senior police officers were referred to the Police Complaints Tribunal, little attention was given 
to them and the ensuing investigation into their veracity was described by Kimmins as having 
been ‘dealt with in a rather perfunctory manner’ (Kimmins, 1998, p. 93). The refusal of the 
Police Complaints Tribunal to undertake a thorough investigation in this case is particularly 
noteworthy considering that Kenafake, the primary target of Operation Firefighter, was an 
employee of that agency and it was the claim of officers attached to the investigation that his 
place of employment was also scheduled to be raided on 4 April.  
 
Again, as in the case of the secretly recorded claims made by Kevin Lynch, it is apparent that 
a process of moral deregulation that commenced under Lewis led to the Queensland police 
demonstrating very little impetus to pursue allegations that senior officers were involved in any 
way with covering up the activity of suspected child sex offenders (Coate & Murray, 2017). 
Allegations in this case also bear considerable similarities to the Grenning case, with the 
suggestion that police made an active effort to stymie an investigation into child sexual 
offences due to the perception that the targeted individual had strong political affiliations which 
made it undesirable to pursue claims made against them (Kimmins, 1998). Whether the 
intention was simply to protect police officers or, more sinisterly, to facilitate the ongoing 
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operation of a paedophile network in Queensland, it was Kimmins’ view that the Police 
Complaints Tribunal was lax in its follow-up to the leaking of confidential information prior 
to the Operation Firefighter raids. In spite of the incident becoming public through 
Mackenroth’s speech in state parliament, there was very little organisational pressure to 
uncover the truth of the matter and take disciplinary action against those responsible (Kimmins, 
1998). Technically an independent entity that was intentionally separate to the police force, the 
Police Complaints Tribunal was also subject to the same type of organisational culture as the 
Queensland Police Force. Its attempts to resolve the truth in the matter of the Kenafake leak 
were found to be highly insufficient, in spite of the fact that Kenafake was an employee of the 
tribunal and that if protection was afforded to him it would reflect poorly on the integrity of 
the organisation. Even so, the Police Complaints Tribunal’s investigation was cursory at best 
and did not come to any definitive resolution as to whether there was any truth in the allegations 
that Kenafake and his associates were tipped off.  As was the case in similar investigations 
undertaken by the Queensland Police Force, the Police Complaints Tribunal had a clear motive 
for inaction in this case: by not conducting a complete and thorough investigation, the tribunal 
was able to make the honest claim that they had found no evidence that individuals in their 
own organisation acted inappropriately. Similar to the situation when Moore and Officer W 
were investigated by the Queensland Police Force, this inability to identify failures in the 
system effectively absolves the Police Complaints Tribunal of responsibility. Protecting the 
force’s reputation is a key element in the organisational culture of policing in Queensland, and 
a strong influence on the subcultural norms that promote obstruction.  Due to the limited nature 
of the investigation conducted in this case, the potential causes for the failure of the Operation 
Firefighter raids remain unclear; it is possible that, by not making an effort to determine the 
source of the leak, the Police Complaints Tribunal was complicit in perpetuating an anomic 
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organisational culture by allowing compromised officers to continue serving at the highest 
level of the Queensland police. 
 
Conclusion 
From the foundation of the JAB in 1963, the Queensland Police Force regularly boasted of the 
successes it had achieved in using the discretionary counsel and caution method in its dealings 
with young people across the state. This preference for discretionary policies was brought to 
the Commissioner’s Office by Lewis, who had refined its use to an art form during his decade-
long period as head of the JAB. In the years that he served as Police Commissioner, Lewis 
presided over a period in which a toxic organisational culture triggered an anomic condition in 
which there was a clear mismatch in the norms subscribed to by Queensland police officers. 
Under this organisational culture, in which corruption was tolerated and it was expected that 
officers would cover for each other, cases of child sexual abuse routinely went un-investigated 
if there was even the slightest suggestion that doing so would negatively impact on protected 
individuals. There was an expectation that senior police would act in a way that was 
interventionist and obstructive to the pursuit of justice when necessary to protect their allies, 
both inside and outside of the Queensland Police Force. It was Lewis’s view that the role of 
the police force in investigating all child abuse cases should be limited, and he was vocal in his 
preference that such issues should be dealt with on a family or community basis wherever it 
was possible (Lewis, 1985). Lewis maintained this position in spite of reports suggesting that 
the JAB should be more proactive in pursuing suspected cases of child abuse and intervening 
to protect the well-being of children at risk. The overarching policy of non-interventionism 
established as a norm of policing under Lewis undoubtedly had negative repercussions for 
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those victims that were not protected and allowed to fall through the gaps of the system 
(Morgan & Zedner, 1992).  
 
Regardless of the reason for inaction on child sexual abuse cases, the fact remains that the 
Queensland Police Force demonstrated a pattern of moral deregulation that was a by-product 
of an anomic organisational culture that existed during Lewis’s time as Police Commissioner. 
Central to this organisational culture is a misalignment of social norms which influences the 
perspective of police officers; because of this misalignment, a moral grey area is formed in 
which police are more susceptible toward taking a pragmatic position on child sexual abuse 
cases than the community might otherwise expect. In Queensland, the subcultural pressures on 
officers meant that it was often considered more important to protect members of or allies to 
the force than it was to execute their professional responsibility to investigate criminal 
behaviours; this is not a trend that is unique to the Queensland Police Force, and can be 
observed as a motivating factor for discretionary inaction in similar circumstances across the 
world. While the obstruction of investigations into police officers and other prominent public 
figures can be observed in relation to any number of offences, the gap between police behaviour 
and public expectations is most prominent in the case of child sexual abuse. Moral outrage is 
an intrinsic factor when it comes to the response to crimes against vulnerable children. The fact 
that police officers would make the conscious choice not to act on child sexual abuse 
allegations invariably attracts criticism, no matter what jurisdiction it takes place in. However, 
as has proven to be the case in other inquiries into institutional responses to child sexual abuse, 
it has proven challenging to deconstruct the contextual conditions that result in the formation 
of such an anomic organisational culture. Breaking down the protective barriers within 
organisations can be difficult, as has proven the case with accusations of child sexual abuse in 
the American Catholic Church (Frawley-O’Dea, 2004); as Operation Fairbanks has shown in 
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the United Kingdom, there is an institutional resistance when it comes to cooperating with 
investigations that essentially pose a risk to that institution’s reputation and ongoing existence 
(Grierson, 2015). Just as these factors have played a role in obstructing investigations into child 
sexual abuse claims overseas, the response to allegations of obstruction in the Queensland 
Police Force have faced considerable obstruction from an organisation reluctant to participate 
in cultural change. 
 
Nevertheless, this study casts light on a period of the Queensland Police Force’s history in 
which the existence of a state of anomie fostered an organisational culture in which inaction 
on child sexual abuse cases was tolerated and, at times, encouraged. On a micro-level, the 
anomic condition in the Queensland Police Force could also be observed to exist between 
senior police and the officers directly tasked with investigating child sexual abuse in the JAB; 
while the frontline officers of the JAB saw justification in pursuing child sexual abuse 
allegations, there was an awareness that a mismatch in their moral norms and those of their 
superiors meant that any such investigation would be obstructed and, ultimately, fruitless. As 
a result of their failure to act, the Queensland police allowed potential offenders to persist in 
their illicit behaviours unabated and were, to some degree, complicit in the victimisation of 
many young Queenslanders.  
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